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Identifying infected energy systems in the wild
ABSTRACT
The 2016 Mirai outbreak established an entirely new mindset in
the history of large-scale Internet attacks. A plethora of Mirai-like
variants have emerged in the last two years that are capable to
infiltrate any type of device. In this paper we provide a 7-month ret-
rospective analysis of Internet-connected energy systems that are
infected by Mirai-like malware variants. By utilizing network mea-
surements from several Internet vantage points, we demonstrate
that a number of energy systems on a global scale were infected
during the period of our observation.While past works have studied
vulnerabilities and patching practises of ICS and energy systems,
little information has been available on actual exploits of such
vulnerabilities. Hence, we provide evidence that energy systems
relying on ICS networks are often compromised by vulnerabilities
in non-ICS devices (routers, servers and IoT devices) which provide
foothold for lateral network attacks. Our work offers a first look
in compromised energy systems by malware infections, and offers
insights on the lack of proper security practices for systems that
are increasingly dependent on internet services and more recently
the IoT. In addition, we indicate that such systems were infected
for relatively large periods, thus potentially remaining undetected
by their corresponding organizational units.
1 INTRODUCTION
The rapid convergence of the IoT with ICS systems is undoubtedly
a core functional block in modern energy systems. We witness a
radical shift towards the administration of power infrastructures,
such as wind-turbines, PV panels and residential UPS batteries,
that are controlled remotely through IP-supported ICS protocols.
Traditionally, ICS systems run by protocols originally designed to
operate in networks with no public connectivity. Built-in security
mechanisms within such protocols tend to be minimal or even
nonexistent [4]. Regardless of this worrying fact, such systems
nowadays are configured to enable public connectivity. Moreover,
the ICS ecosystem now includes multiple Internet-facing elements,
such as web and file server, IP cameras, and other IoT devices used
to orchestrate critical energy systems.
The ubiquity of IoT devices has also transformed the way in
which Internet-wide volumetric attacks are instrumented. The most
prominent example of this new trend is the Mirai botnet [1]. Ever
since the first reported incident in 2016, followed by the malware’s
source code being leaked, there is a growing number of Mirai-like
variants targeting a plethora of vulnerable deployments. Hence,
modern energy systems controlled by recently converged ICS sys-
tems are potential targets of such botnets. Potentially infected en-
ergy system may participate in coordinated large-scale DDoS at-
tacks over a critical infrastructure or even act maliciously at a local
level causing a resilience havoc. Therefore, we consider this problem
as a new pragmatic challenge. We argue that this challenge needs
to be addressed under a data-driven and holistic approach in order
to aid the composition of future automated defense mechanisms.
As a step towards a systematic approach, in this paper we demon-
strate some work in progress related to the identification and pro-
filing of energy systems that are currently infected by Mirai-alike
variants. We employ a measurements-based methodology in which
we utilise Internet-wide measurements gathered by a number of dif-
ferent network vantage points. Our 7-month retrospective analysis
considers active and omni-directional scans as well as Telnet/SSH
honeypots that track Mirai-alike botnets. Earlier pieces of work
(e.g., [4, 9, 11] focused on identifying vulnerabilities and on patch-
ing practises of ICS and energy systems. On the contrary, our work
is the first to provide an insight related to existing compromised
energy systems at a global scale. We hope that this work will bring
this pragmatic challenge in to the light and will consequently alarm
security experts, organisations, as well as end-users that design and
manage such systems.
2 METHODOLOGY
The discovery and analysis of infected energy systems across the
Internet requires the synthesis of multiple diverse network mea-
surements. Hence, we utilise a variety of measurement sources
summarized in Table 1. In this section, we discuss our data sources
and the role they play in our analysis.
2.1 Detection of Malicious Hosts
The first step in our study is to compile an extensive dataset of
Internet hosts that participate in malicious network activity. To
this end, we combine three different sources of malicious traffic: a
distributed honeypot for Mirai-like botnets, a network telescope
for unsolicited traffic, and blacklists with IP addresses of spamming
botnets.
2.1.1 Telnet/SSH Honeypots. Since the Mirai 2016 outbreak little
has been done to assess on whether Internet-connected devices
that operate on protocols explicit to the control and management
of energy networks are likely to be infected a with any Mirai-
like variant. More importantly, no study has been done to assess
on whether any infected devices by such variants were actually
patched by the organisation handling them. To assess compromised
energy systems by such botnets we have deployed a low-interaction
distributed honeypot. We operate 11 SSH and Telnet honeypots
located in three countries: United States (3 in Las Vegas, Nevada, 1 in
Minden, Nevada, 3 in Los Angeles, California), Russia (2 inMoscow),
and Brazil (2 in Sao Paulo). Each honeypot is configured to log all
incoming traffic, and logfiles are then aggregated and indexed using
Splunk for analysis. From there we match Mirai-like fingerprint by
comparing the TCP sequence with the IP addresses. In particular,
Mirai bots send TCP SYN packets with the TCP initial sequence
number equal to the destination IP of the targeted host [1]. Given
that the TCP sequence number is a 32-bit integer, the likelihood
of an identified Mirai-like fingerprint being set at random is only
1
232 . Based on this technique, our honeypots have detected 511,636
Mirai-like probes between 2017/02/17 – 2019/01/23.
Data Source Collection Site Collection Period Data Volume
Active scanning Censys 01/05/2018 -30/11/2018 147 full IPv4 scans, 6 protocols
Omni-directional scanning Grey Noise 01/11/2017 -30/11/2018 330K log entries
Telnet/SSH honeypot BadPackets LLC 02/19/2017 - 23/01/2019 511K IP addresses
Telnet/SSH honeypot Grey Noise 01/01/2018-30/11/2018 260K IP addresses
IP Blacklists UCEProtect,Spamhouse 01/02/2018-26/12/2018 347K IP addresses
Total Infected IPs 684K
Table 1: Data sources: network vantage points analysed to identify infected energy system devices with Mirai-like variants.
2.1.2 Unsolicited Internet Traffic Telescope. We augment the identi-
fied infected IPs by Mirai-like variants using GreyNoise, a telescope
for unsolicited Internet traffic [5] . Typically botnets and malware
discover potential vulnerable attack targets by conducting large-
scale opportunistic scans of randomly selected IP prefixes. How-
ever, large scale scans of the IP address space are also conducted
for research and survey purposes by systems such as Censys [2]
and Shodan [3], while network misconfigurations may cause sim-
ilar effects. This incessant non-productive traffic termed Internet
Background Radiation may mask malicious traffic sources when
studying isolated traffic snapshots [8]. However, traffic analysis
across large time scales and across multiple vantage points allows
the extraction of unique patterns and characteristics for malicious
scanners. GreyNoise enables such an analysis through a network
of constantly shifting servers in hundreds of data centers across
the Internet. On a daily basis, GreyNoise aggregates approximately
2M iptable events, 1M SSH logins, 10M telnet login attempts as
well as 100K HTTP requests. The aggregation is performed over
GreyNoise’s 50 – 100 cloud servers in varying geographical regions.
In parallel an internal tagging process is employed using passive op-
erating system (p0f) logs for each observed record in which a scan
might be considered benign or potentially malicious depending on
its origin, its frequency and its visibility across the GreyNoise net-
work. We extract bulk measurements by a centralised GreyNoise
server between November 2017 and November 2018 and as we
show in section 3 we utilise them to identify which IPs originate
malicious scans and on which ports.
2.1.3 Real-time Blackhole Lists (RBL). Network operators use Real-
time Blackhole Lists (RBLs) to track and block IP addresses that
participate in malicious activities, such as spamming, click-fraud,
and distribution of malware. RBLs are constructed either through
spamtraps, unused email addresses that receive spam emails from
bots that search and scrape the web for spamming targets, or by
aggregating logs from firewalls and intrusion detection systems
from multiple networks. We aggregate blacklisted IPs from two
major RBLs, UCEProtect [7] and Spamhaus [10]. We use only the
Level-1 from the UCEProtect project, which is themost conservative
level, to minimize false positives. Overall our list contains 347,551
IPs between February and December 2018.
2.2 Active Scanning
After we compile the set of malicious IP addresses, we need to nar-
row down our results on ICS devices. it is necessary to first gather
Internet-wide scans over particular ICS protocols. To fingerprint
the ports and services active at the identified , we utilise network
scans provided by Censys [2] performed over the full IPv4 address






Siemens S7 36,728 8,704
Telnet 74,100,017 17,001,702
Total 75,435,109 17,183,173
Table 2: Responsive banners and devices to active scans per-
formed via Censys between May and November 2018.
Our study considers Censys scans over 5 distinct protocols used
in modern energy systems, namely; Modbus, Siemens S7, DNP3,
BACnet and Tridium Fox. All 5 protocols enable intra- and inter-
network communication between (sub)stations, and mainly focus
on aspects of control, distribution and automation.
To facilitate the management of the devices that rely on the
above protocols and enable remote access, system administrators
often enable the Telnet protocol on the TCP ports 23 and 2323.
Therefore, our analysis also considers full IPv4 Censys scans over
the Telnet protocol in those TCP ports.
To reduce the high dimensionality of our datasets we only con-
sider network scans of responsive devices running in the aforemen-
tioned protocols. Thus, our Censys queries over Google’s BigQuery
filter out devices that block scans or contain empty response ban-
ners where no useful information is present. Table 2 provides a
per-protocol view of the number of banners as well as unique de-
vices that were responsive to the active scans performed by Censys.
ModBus and Fox were the two protocols that had the biggest num-
bers in terms of open banners aswell as devices, while DNP3was the
protocol with the smallest number of open banners and responsive
devices. In contrast with any of the of the energy systems-related
protocols, we witness that Telnet, either on TCP port 23 or 2323,
had a much higher number of responsive devices that have also pro-
vided 74M open banners with meaningful information. We identify
energy systems that operate telnet-based services by correlating de-
vices running on any of the conventional energy-related protocols
with the responsive Telnet devices.
3 RESULTS
At a first stage, we investigate devices that operate on any of the
conventional energy system protocols. We subsequently study in-
fected systems that run conventional protocols with web services.
3.1 Tracking infected energy systems
The correlation of our Censys and GreyNoise scans with the two










































































Figure 1: Global distribution - The number of /24 networks
per country that contained Telnet-supported energy sys-
tems infected by Mirai-like malware strains.
Figure 2: Difference in seconds between the first and last
time an IP was captured by our honeypots.
globally that have been reported within Mirai-like botnet activ-
ities and run ICS protocols. We find that a 64.2% corresponding
to 1, 304 out of all 1, 604 infected IP addresses were running the
ModBus protocol. In addition, 338 infected IPs running the Trid-
ium/Fox protocol were ranked second reaching 21.2% whereas 227
infected devices operating the BACnet protocol contributed to a
14.3%. The smallest percentage was observed by devices employing
the Siemens/S7 protocol (i.e., 0.3%, 5 devices). Figure 2 shows the
time length during which an IP appears to be infected based on the
activity in our honeypots. More than 50% of the IPs are active for
at least 11 days, indicating that the infection went undetected.
Interestingly, we did not spot any devices operating over the
DNP3 protocol and this fact could potentially convey the mes-
sage that systems operating under that protocol are less prone to
Mirai-like variants. To understand where most of the infections are
concentrated at a global scale we correlated geolocation data with
each identified IP address. Table 3 depicts the top ten countries with
the highest number of infected devices. As shown, the Republic of
Korea reached the top place with 443 infected devices, where all of
them were running the ModBus protocol. The second place is occu-
pied by devices residing within Autonomous Systems (ASes) in the
US. In contrast with most of the other countries where the majority
identified devices were running ModBus, the majority of US-based
infected networks was operating the Tridium/Fox protocol (48.7%).
In addition, 66.4% of devices located in Canada were running on
BACnet and the remaining 33.6% on Tridium/Fox, while none was
operating over ModBus.
From a general viewpoint, we observe that the global distribution









443 100% 0% 0% 0%
USA 437 23.3% 48.7% 28% 0%
Canada 110 0% 33.6% 66.4% 0%
Turkey 90 77.7% 22.3% 0% 0%
France 80 62.5% 0% 37.5% 0%
Italy 75 84% 10.6% 0% 5.4%
Thailand 53 100% 0% 0% 0%
Romania 42 100% 0% 0% 0%
China 38 52.6% 47.4% 0% 0%
Russia 35 100% 0% 0% 0%
Table 3: Geographic distribution - We compare the top ten
countries that harbored the most infections with respect to
the 4 conventional energy system protocols.
account for 55% of all the identified infected devices. We argue
that this observation could act as an insight on questioning the
cybersecurity policies employed on energy systems in both the
Republic of Korea and the US.
Subsequently, we correlate Telnet scans (Table 1) with the rest
of Censys scans to identify /24 network prefixes that contain de-
vices operating both conventional energy system protocols that are
also supported by Telnet-based services. Apart from typical banner
metadata properties such AS number, IP address and network pre-
fix, the correlation procedure considers geolocation coordinates in
order to validate the pragmatic physical distance between the ex-
tracted set of devices. The post-processed dataset was subsequently
correlated with the GreyNoise and the honeypot datasets in order
to identify if any of the Telnet-supported energy systems is likely
to contain infected devices.
On a global scale, we extracted a total of 215 /24 networks flagged
to contain Telnet-supported infected energy systems within our
observational 7-month time period. As shown in Fig. 1 the 215 /24
networks are distributed within 14 different countries. By com-
paring the resulted global distribution with the one obtained for
conventional systems with no Telnet support (Table 3), it is evident
that the rankings have changed significantly. For instance, the Re-
public of Korea is not present at all, meaning that most infections
were within the same /24 and udner the administration of a single
organization. Moreover, we witness countries that didn’t appear
earlier, such as the French Guiana with 28 /24 networks in which
infected Telnet-supported ICS/energy systems are present.
3.2 Device Composition and Vulnerabilities
So far we have identified that each of the infected IPs has at least
one ICS device, but in many cases the same IP may have multiple
devices indicating the presence of Network Address Translation
(NAT). To distinguish different devices behind the same IP, Censys
relies on device information embedded in service banners. Figure 3a
shows the number of identified devices per IP. We can see that only
20% of the IPs include only one device (which will be the identified
ICS device), while the rest of the infected IPs contain a mix of two
devices or more. For each of the devices behind the same NAT as
the identified ICS devices we collect the service information to































Figure 3: (a) Number of devices per infected IP – Over 30%
of the ICS run behind a NAT with multple publicy exposed
devices. (b) Fraction of devices per service - We observe 37
different services behind the infected IP addresses most of









































Figure 4: (a) Fraction of disclosed vulnerabilities per service.
(b) Distribution of number of days passed since vulnerability
disclosure
Figure 3b plots the distribution of non-ICS devices per protocol.
In total we observe 37 different protocols, with HTTP/HTTPs being
the most popular, typically used to serve web-based interfaces for
remote administration. Surprisingly, only 34% of the web based
interfaces use HTTPS, while the rest transmit the login forms unen-
crypted. The banners received from these interfaces provide us fur-
ther information to identify the managed ICS devices. For instance,
the IP 58.64.7.60 has devices with both the modbus and HTTP
protocols. By querying the HTTP server we can parse the HTML
of the front-end interface which includes the banner: <title>WAGO
Ethernet Web-Based Management</title>. Therefore, we can
map the device to the actual manufacturer and product.
The presence of multiple services behind an infected IP means
that any of the exposed devices may be the source of the infection,
not necessarily the ICS device. We attempt to determine which of
the devices may have been compromised by searching for docu-
mented security vulnerabilities for each of the identified services,
following the approach in [11]. Through the corresponding ban-
ners we extract the service version which we use to search the
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [6] for Common Vulner-
ability Exposures (CVE). For the documented vulnerabilities we
extract the publication date and the CVSS (Common Vulnerability
Scoring System) value that indicates the severity of the vulnera-
bility. Overall we discovered 832 unpatched vulnerabilities for the
services shown Figure 4a. The IoT tag groups vulnerabilities in IoT
products. The vulnerabilities are broken down based on the CVSS
score, according to about 20% of the vulnerabilities have high or
critical severity. Alarmingly, 75% of the vulnerabilities are older
than 5 years as shown in Figure 4b. Our results provide strong evi-
dence that the ICS networks related to particular energy systems
have been compromised by vulnerabilities in non-ICS protocols.
Therefore, without a more holistic approach in the security of en-
ergy systems, network components that are considered less critical
create channels for lateral network attacks that can go undetected.
4 RELATEDWORK
Project SHINE (SHodan INtelligence Extraction) [9] attempted to
measure the ICS devices connected to the public Internet by ex-
tracting metadata from SHODAN, a search engine for embedded
devices. By using a 927 keywords that were manually determined
to belong to ICS products and vendor names, SHINE identified at
over 500K Internet-accessible manufacturing devices between April
2012 and January 2014. The authors determined that many of the
discovered devices were accidentally connected to the Internet due
to misconfigurations. Mirian et al. [4] conducted a survey of the
IPv4 address space to estimate the number of ICS devices exposed
on the public Internet, by implementing five of the most popular
ICS protocols in Zmap They discover more than 60k between De-
cember 2015 and March 2016, 69% of which are Modbus bridges.
The authors then combined data from a network telescope and ICS
honeypots to characterize the networks that search for vulnerable
devices. While the majority of traffic originates from academic in-
stitutions and security firms, bulletproof hosting providers are also
among the regular scanners. Wang et al [11] combined IP scan data
from Shodan over a period of three years with public databases on
vulnerability disclosures to conduct a longitudinal analysis of ICS
patching practices. Their findings reveal that the majority of ex-
posed ICS devices are not patched even 60 days after the disclosure
of vulnerabilities, while the exploitability of vulnerabilities are only
weakly correlated with patching deferral times.
5 CONCLUSION
In contrast to previous studies that examined potential ICS vulnera-
bilities, this work provides the first study assessing actual infections
over energy systems. Using a combination of several Internet-wide
network vantage points we identify energy systems infected by
Mirai-like malware strains. We also demonstrate that security in
such systems can be compromised by any type of web service and
not necessarily the utilised ICS protocol. Moreover, we indicate
poor patching practices on a global scale and flag patterns over par-
ticular countries that indicate the need to improve their practices on
energy systems security. Alongside poor patching, we also pinpoint
the weakness of intrusion detection systems to detect a range of
infections since we show that infections on such systems persist
over a great amount of time. Through this work-in-progress we em-
phasize that focus on composing holistic security mechanisms for
such systems should be on all components and not explicitly on the
mechanics of ICS protocols. We recognise that our results represent
a subset of the reality due to limited Internet-wide visibility. There-
fore our on-going work targets to significantly increase the number
of network vantage points in order to enrich our Internet-wide
view on infected devices operating energy systems.
4
REFERENCES
[1] Manos Antonakakis, Tim April, Michael Bailey, Matt Bernhard, Elie Bursztein,
Jaime Cochran, Zakir Durumeric, J. Alex Halderman, Luca Invernizzi, Michalis
Kallitsis, Deepak Kumar, Chaz Lever, Zane Ma, Joshua Mason, Damian Menscher,
Chad Seaman, Nick Sullivan, Kurt Thomas, and Yi Zhou. 2017. Understanding the
Mirai Botnet. In 26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17). USENIX
Association, Vancouver, BC, 1093–1110. https://www.usenix.org/conference/
usenixsecurity17/technical-sessions/presentation/antonakakis
[2] Zakir Durumeric, David Adrian, Ariana Mirian, Michael Bailey, and J. Alex
Halderman. 2015. A Search Engine Backed by Internet-Wide Scanning. In 22nd
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
[3] John Matherly. 2015. Complete Guide to Shodan. Shodan, LLC (2016-02-25)
(2015).
[4] Ariana Mirian, Zane Ma, David Adrian, Matthew Tischer, Thasphon Chuenchujit,
Tim Yardley, Robin Berthier, Joshua Mason, Zakir Durumeric, J Alex Halderman,
et al. 2016. An Internet-wide view of ICS devices. In Privacy, Security and Trust
(PST), 2016 14th Annual Conference on. IEEE, 96–103.
[5] Andrew Morris. 2018. The Background Noise of the Internet. ShmooCon 2018.
[6] National Institute of Standards and Technology. 2019. National Vulnerability
Database. https://nvd.nist.gov/
[7] UCEProtect Orga. 2019. The UCEPROTECT-Network Project. http://www.
uceprotect.net
[8] Ruoming Pang, Vinod Yegneswaran, Paul Barford, Vern Paxson, and Larry Peter-
son. 2004. Characteristics of internet background radiation. In Proceedings of the
4th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement. ACM, 27–40.
[9] B Radvanovsky and J Brodsky. 2014. Project SHINE (SHodan INtelligence Extrac-
tion). Technical Report. Tech. rep.
[10] Spamhaus. 2019. The Spamhaus Project. https://www.spamhaus.org/
[11] Brandon Wang, Xiaoye Li, Leandro P de Aguiar, Daniel S Menasche, and Zubair
Shafiq. 2017. Characterizing and Modeling Patching Practices of Industrial Con-
trol Systems. Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing
Systems 1, 1 (2017), 18.
5
